Maryland Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 2

Article 4

Disposition of Void and Otherwise Failing Devises
in Maryland

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Recommended Citation
Disposition of Void and Otherwise Failing Devises in Maryland, 2 Md. L. Rev. 142 (1938)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol2/iss2/4

This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Comments and Casenotes
DISPOSITION OF VOID AND OTHERWISE
FAILING DEVISES IN MARYLAND
The Maryland, minority rule to the effect that a lapsed
or void devise will pass to the heir and not to the residuary
devisee,1 raises some speculation as to whether or not the
rule carries over to devises which fail for other reasons. A
determination of this question necessitates a discussion of
the rule itself, and also a differentiation between absolute
devises and devises in trust.
The case which originally stated the doctrine in question
2 In that case the testator had dewas Lin.qan v. Carroll.
vised certain land in trust for educational purposes. The
defendant, testator's heir-at-law, entered upon the land on
the supposition that, the devise in trust being void, the land
passed to him rather than to the residuary devisee. The
residuary devisee brought a bill against the executor of the
heir, he having died, to compel an account of the profits of
the real estate into which the heir had entered. On demurrer the bill was dismissed, and the Court of Appeals,
without opinion, affirmed the lower court.
The residuary devise in this case was in the following
terms: "rest and residue of my real estate, not herein
before disposed of." Despite this broad language the Court
held that, since the testator had de facto devised the land, it
would not pass, though in fact there was no effectual disposition. The Court said:
. .. he intended to dispose fully of the land in
question . . .; and the law being settled, that in case of
a lapsed devise, the land shall pass to the heir and not
to the residuary devisee, and there being no solid disSee Miller, Construction of Wills, Sees. 58, 98, 159; notes. 44 L. . A.
(N. S.) 793; 10 A. L. R. 1526; 108 A. L. R. 476; Lingan v. Carroll, 3 H. &
McH. 333 (1793). But this rule does not apply to personalty. See Cox V.
Harris, 17 Md. 23 (1861); Deford v. Deford, 36 Md. 168 (1872) ; Orrick v.
Boelim, 49 Md. 72 (1878); Rizer v. Perry, 58 Md. 112 (1881) ; Dulaney T.
Middleton, 72 Md. 67, 19 AtI. 146 (1899) ; Prettyman v. Baker, 91 Md. 539,
46 AtI. 1020 (1900).
While the Maryland lapse statute, Md. Code,. Art. 93,
See. 335, and Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 335A, now prevents the possibility of lapse, the problem herein discussed includes this possibility both

because the cases are based upon lapse cases and because the discussion
may be of interest in- states either having no lapse statute or a statute not
so broad as the Maryland one.

s3 H. &'McH. 333 (1798).
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tinction between the case of a lapsed devise and the
case of a devise void by the rules of law, it being manifest in both cases that the testator did not intend the
land de facto devised to go to the residuary devisees,"
(the heir will take)."
The problem did not again arise until nearly seventy
years later, at which time the Court of Appeals, in the case
of Tongque's Lessee v. Nutwell,4 recognized that the Maryland rule was against the preponderance of authority elsewhere, but held that, since it had been followed and acquiesced in by the legal profession as sound Maryland law for
such a long period of time, and since there was no distinction
between a lapsed devise and one void by the rules of law,
therefore the rule would be upheld. The rule has thus become firmly embodied in the common law of Maryland and
has withstood many attempts to dislodge it.
Most outstanding among these attempts is that made in
the case of Rizer v. Perty.' There it was contended that
the rule had been superseded by the statute' which provided
,that wills speak as of the time of the death of the testator
rather than as of the date of execution. The Court, however, concluded that, since a desire that the residuary devisee was to take the void devise did not appear in the will,
and since a different intention was naturally inferable from
the attempt to dispose of it otherwise, the Court could not,
by force of the statute alone, hold that the void devise
passed to the residuary devisee.
The rationale of these cases is that since the testator
intended to dispose of the land in question, he has shown
an intention not to give the property to the residuary devisee, and, while he has also shown an intention by the
attempted devise not to give the property to the heir-at-law,
yet, the devise being void or having lapsed, should- go, as
between the heir-at-law and the residuary devisee, to the
former because "the heir is not to be excluded in favor of
. . . the residuary devisee by mere implication or intendment. Nothing less than clear, substantive and undeniable
intent on the part of the testator will exclude him . . .
This being so, can it not be said that any reversion which is
a Ibid, 834.

'13 Md. 415 (1859).
Md. 112 (1882). And see also Cox v. Harris, 17 Md. 23, 31 (1861);
Barnum v. Barnum, 26 'id. 119, 174 (1866); Rea v. Twiley, 35 Md. 409
(1872) ; Orrlck v. Boehm, 49 Md. 72, 105 (1878) ; Chilcoat v. Reid, 154 Md.
378, 140 At. 100 (1927).
a 58

Md. Code, Art. 93, See. 309, Acts 1849, Ch. 229.

'58 Md. 112, 119.
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left in the testator as a result of a failure to attempt disposition will pass by the residuary clause, provided of course
that that clause is broad enough to include property of the
type involved in any one particular case ?
That this is so has been recognized by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in the case of Fulton v. Harma s where,
the testator having devised land to his wife for life, and
having devised all the rest of his property by a general
residuary clause to his son, the Court held that the fee
passed under the residuary. clause. While the language
used was broader than called for by the circumstances of
the case, the principle stated has been upheld by other decisions of the court.'
The conclusion thus far is that while devises which are
void or which lapse go to the heir-at-law, yet any undisposed
of interest will pass by a residuary devise, if that be in terms
broad enough. This, however, raises an inquiry as to when
therie is an undisposed of reversion in the testator. It is
elementary that where a devise is absolute in terms, any
interest not devised is a reversionary interest in the testator; but what of a devise to trustees in fee ? In such a case
do the trustees take the complete fee even though it may not
be necessary to carry out the trust?
One of the leading Maryland text-writers on the subject" has stated the rule as follows:
"Whether an estate given to trustees in any particular case is a fee simple estate, or any other estate, does
not depend upon whether the testator has used words
of limitation or expressions adequate to carry an estate
of inheritance, but whether the exigencies of the trust
as they appear on the face of the will, without reference
to events subsequent to the testator's death, demand
the fee simple, or can be satisfied by any and what less
estate, the trustees take exactly the quantity of interest
which the purposes of the trust require. 1 "
6 44 Md. 251 (1875). See particularly page 262, where the Court said:
"The devise or bequest of all of the testator's property, real, personal, and mixed, included aU reversionary interests however remote.
which were undisposed of by the previous provisions of the will."
(Italics ours.)
'Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 312 (1874) ; Red v. Walbach, et al., 75 Md.
205, 23 AtL 472 (1892) ; and as to personalty Holmes v. Mackenzie, 118 Md.
210, 84 AtL 340 (1912).
10 Miller Construction of Wills, Seem 0.
But the rule as to personalty
"I Restatement of Trusts, See. 88 (semble).
is the reverse, se Restatement of Trusts, Sec. 88 and Price v. Price, 162 Md.
656 161 Ati. 2 (03)2).

FAILING DEVISES
Do the Maryland cases bear out this rule1 The case
most clearly stating the rule is Brown v. Reeder. 2 There
the settlor deeded property to trustees for herself for life
and after her death for the use and benefit of her son and
his heirs forever. It was contended that a perpetuity was
thereby created, but the Court held that on the death of the
survivor of the settlor and her son, the whole equitable
estate would vest in the heirs of the son, and they would
then be entitled to a conveyance of the legal title. The
principle upon which the decision was based was that the
extent of the legal interest of a trustee in an estate given to
him in trust is measured, not by words of inheritance or
equivalent terms but by the object and extent of the trust
upon which the estate is given." Most of the cases to be
found deal with the interest of the beneficiary in remainder
and do not concern themselves with the question here presented.
There is authority, however, in the case of Warner,et al.,
v. Spriggq, et al.,"4 for the prop6sition that where testator
does not make complete disposition by his devise in trust,
the remainder will be in the testator (and under the rule of
FPidton v. Harman, will go to the residuary devisee). In
that case the testator had devised certain property in trust
for one W. (The Court held legal title to be in W, the trust
being passive.) W conveyed to a trustee to hold on certain
trusts, which did not exhaust the whole of the property. In
this situation the Court held that all the interests which the
grantor (W) did not convey necessarily remained in him,
and consequently the reversion was vested in him. Thus,
if testator devises to trustees in fee, but the purposes of the
trust do not dispose of the entire fee, there will remain in
the testator a reversionary interest which will pass by the
residuary clause.
Is the rule true as to void or lapsed devises? Certainly
if a devise to trustees is void, then unless the trustee holds
by way of resulting trust, the exigencies of the trust as apparent "on the face of the will" (the face of the will showing the devise to be void) will not require the full fee, and
there will be a reversion in the testator which will pass to
the residuary devisee. The devise in Lin.qan v. Carrollwas
to trustees and was held void, and yet the heir and not the
19108 Md. 653, 71 A. 417 (1908).
IS See generally on the problem Long v. Long, 62 Md. 65 (1883) ; Numsen
v. Lyon, 87 Md. 31, 39 At. 533 (1897) ; Brillhart v. Mish, 99 Md. 447. 58 Ati.
28 (1904) ; Lyon v. Safe Deposit, 120 Md. 514, 87 AtL 1089 (1913) ; Schmidt
v. Hinkly, 115 Md. 330, 80 Atl. 971 (1911).
1, Warner, et al., v. Sprigg, et al., 62 Md. 14 (1883).
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residuary devisee was held to take. The devise to trustees
there was of the full interest, however, and thus may be
regarded as coming within the rule concerning absolute
devises. If this distinction is a valid one, and in the view
of the present writer it is, then the question of what rule the
court will follow in case of a devise to trustees complete on
its face, which fails in part because void or lapsed, still remains open. The better rule would seem to be that the
trustee will hold by way of resulting trust for the heirs-atlaw whenever the devise to trustees fails in part because
void or lapsed, 5 and that when the devise to trustees is in
itself incomplete, in that it fails to dispose of the entire interest, there will be a reversion in the testator which will pass
by the residuary devise.
The conclusion, therefore, is that whether the devise be
absolute or in trust, if a part of the fee simple interest remains undisposed of the residuary devise takes, but if the
full fee is disposed of, though partially in an ineffectual
manner, the heir-at-law will take either by way of resulting
trust or under the rule of intention stated in Lin.qan v.
Carroll.

EVIDENCE LEGISLATION AT THE 1937 SESSION
At the 1937 regular session of the Maryland General
Assembly several statutes bearing on the field of Evidence
were passed. Chapter 128 provided that, in courts of
equity, questions of foreign law should be decided by the
Court in the same fashion as domestic law; and that the
courts should have discretionary power to take judicial
notice of such foreign law if it be that of a jurisdiction having the Anglo-American system of law. A similar statute
had been passed several years earlier for the courts of law.
Chapter 197 provides that when testimony shall be taken in
open court in equity cases, it need not be written up by the
stenographer save when either an appeal is to be taken or
the court so orders it.
Chapter 523 provides for the use of affidavits of accounts
in actions ex contractu before Justices of the Peace, and
furnishes an additional method of securing judgment upon
affidavit in such courts.
Chapter 124 adopts the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from without a State in Criminal
1
The effect of which ismerely to carry over the intention rule of Lingan
v. Carroll to the trust situation.

